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GEORGE R. FARNUMt
T E United States Supreme Court in 1865 decided against the inclusion
within the jurisdiction of the admiralty of those torts in which "The
origin of the wrong was on the water, but the substance and consum-
mation of the injury on land"; ' wrongs which "for want of a better
word" were once not ineptly designated by Mr. Justice Henry B. Brown
as "amphibious torts." 2 Thus authoritively sired the principle has
come down to the present day, bringing with it the prestige of an impos-
ing accumulation of concurring judicial opinion. In the converse situa-
tion, however, jurisdiction was early sustained 3 and has never since
been seriously questioned.4
In the decades that have followed that eventful decision, experience
with the operation of the rule has forced upon some the uneasy conviction
that it is not working satisfactorily under modern conditions-that, in
fact, it has become a functional misfit and a hindrance to sensible adjudi-
cation. With the recent development of boards of Port Authorities in
most important maritime centers, a body of experts have, through their
national association, become articulate and importunate spokesmen for
reconsideration. Through their representations, the question of the ex-
tension of admiralty jurisdiction to damages caused by vessels to land
structures has been under serious consideration by the American Bar
Association
I The gravamen of the protest against retention of the rule can be
briefly summarized. In the first place, some passing stress is placed
upon the anomaly of granting relief in admiralty to the owner of a vessel
damaged by a land structure,' while denying all maritime jurisdiction
when the situation is reversed. The crux of the complaint, however, ap-
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1. The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20 (U. S. 1865), where a fire, which had negligently broken
out on a vessel on navigable waters, was communicated to a wharf and superincumbent
packing houses.
2. See Brown, Jurisdiction of the Admiralty in Cases of Tort (1909) 9 CoL. L. REv. 1.
3. The Superior, 23 How. 209 (U. S. 1859).
4. See Panama Rr. Co. v. Napier Shipping Co., 166 U. S. 280 (1896).
5. (1929) 54 A. B. A. REP. 103; (1930) 55 id. 303 et seq; (1931) 56 id. 64-65, 311
et seq.
6. A remedy in rem, however, has been held not to exist against immovable structures.
The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall. 213 (U. S. 1867).
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pears to be more fundamentally serious and comes down to real ques-
tions of fairness and business convenience. At common law, no action
is maintainable against the owners of a vessel for the fault of a com-
pulsory pilot.7 While in admiralty it is held that a remedy exists in rem
against the ship,' the rule of responsibility in personam does not differ
from that of the common law. The intolerable result is that for damages
caused by vessels to bridges, wharves and other land structures, there
exists no adequate remedy when the fault, as is quite usually the case,
is attributable to the pilot. Furthermore, even if the offending vessel is
not controlled by a pilot imposed by law, to attempt to hold the owners
may, by reason of such circumstances as financial instability or non-
residence, render a theoretical remedy a practical futility.
As recently put in the report of the Standing Committee on Admiralty
and Maritime Law of the American Bar Associaton, "there is a real
need to correct the present unfortunate condition of the law, if that
can be done" and the whole "situation seems so anomalous that it
seems there must be some way to remedy it." ' It appears to be ad-
mitted on all hands that the doctrine is too solidly entrenched under the
weight of accumulated precedents to expect that the United States Su-
preme Court will undertake a complete reversal in attitude. Moreover,
the remedy has not been thought to rest with the legislatures of the
various states having maritime ports.'0 Thus attention centers upon
the question of the constitutionality of relief by an act of Congress ex-
tending the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States
to cases of damages by ships to land structures. Such legislation would
neither imply encroachment upon vested interests nor involve the viola-
tion of any guaranteed right or immunity of the individual, for the
decisions which would be superseded "have not created a rule of prop-
erty around which vested interests have clustered." 1 Any argument
of unconstitutionality comes down to little more in substance than that,
by tradition, logic and precedent, the subject-matter is definitely ex-
cluded from an artificial and arbitrary legal category. Even so put,
there is a questionable concession as to tradition and a dubious assump-
tion as to the unassailability of the logic. It is at this point that the
imposition of constitutional limitations upon legislative action is least
defensible.
7. Homer Ramsdall Transportation Co. v. La Compagnie G~nrale Transatlantique,
182 U. S. 406 (1901).
8. The China, 7 Wall. 53 (U. S. 1868).
9. (1930) 55 A. B. A. REP. 305.
10. "Mr. Ernest Bruncken, the Secretary of the Milwaukee Board of Harbor Commis-
sioners, made it quite plain to the committee that the state court procedure was wholly
inadequate." Id. at 304.




Yet in an elaborate report to the American Bar Association in 1930,
the maritime committee, after a review of the authorities, made the
definite statement that they "leave no doubt that Congress has no author-
ity to extend the Admiralty jurisdiction beyond torts committed on
navigable waters." 12 The committee for the following year, though
containing a majority of new members, adhered to this view, asserting
that "The decisions of the Supreme Court above mentioned seem to
indicate a clear view that admiralty jurisdiction does not and cannot be
made to extend to land structures, even by act of Congress for the
court has stated that Congress cannot enlarge the constitutional grant
of power." ', The writer, though a member of both committees, was
never fully in accord with the conclusions reached by his learned col-
leagues, and, while signing the reports because in an extreme minority,
dissented strongly during committee deliberations.
It may be freely conceded that there are matters so alien to all past
and present conceptions of maritime transactions that they are plainly
and permanently without the constitutional grant "of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction." But it is equally indisputable that there are
other matters wherein jurisdictional limits fixed by tradition, established
by decision or prescribed by legislation, may be modified and extended.
This latter thesis has rarely been more vigorously enunciated than in
the opinion of Judge Groner in The Oconee, 4 wherein among else he
asserted:
"That Congress, under the grant of admiralty jurisdiction, has power and
authority to alter and amend the maritime law and make substantive innova-
tions therein cannot be doubted; for, if it were otherwise, this nation, whose
coast line is more extensive and whose ocean-borne commerce is the greatest
in the world, would be placed alone, of the nations of the world, in a position
where legislation for the improvement, enlargement and protection of these
great interests would be impossible. As was pointed out by Mr. Justice Brad-
ley in The Lottawanna, supra, 21 Wall, 577, 22 L. Ed. 654:
"'It cannot be supposed that the framers of the Constitution contemplated
that the law [maritime] should forever remain unalterable.' "15
It is the submission of the writer that, notwithstanding general state-
ments of the courts, there is nothing inherently incongruous, either in
logic or tradition, in treating torts originating on a vessel on navigable
waters as possessing essential characteristics of a maritime transaction,
though the damage is consummated on land. On the other hand, there is
every reason, if the law is to find its justification in the measure in which
12. (1930) 55 A. B. A. REP. 307.
13. (1931) 56 A. B. A. REP. 314.
14. 280 Fed. 927 (E. D. Va. 1922).
15. Id. at 931.
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it satisfies business needs and promotes public convenience and equity,
to bring this field of wrongs within the cognizance of the admiralty courts.
"The necessities of the business which makes the law are considerations
ahead of all others, and this is more easily obvious in maritime affairs
than in most other pursuits." 16
As pointed out, the present hampering rule received its judicial bap-
tism almost seventy years ago in The Plymouth.17 The question was
conceded to be "one of first impression," there being "no case in the
books like it." The decision was reached by taking certain broad and
general enunciations of the locality test for delictual jurisdiction and
applying them with punctilious logic to the facts. The wrong was split
into its origin and its consummation. The maritime character of the
former, both in respect to instrumentality and locality, was disregarded
because of what the Court regarded a priori as "the true meaning of
the rule of locality in cases of marine torts, namely, that the wrong and
injury complained of must have been committed wholly upon the high
seas or navigable waters, or, at least, the substance and consummation
of the same must have taken place upon these waters to be within the
admiralty jurisdiction." 18
The decision has been characterized as erroneous."' There is little
to encourage such a categorical judgment in the many subsequent pro-
nouncements of the courts in which the rule has been applied. Doubt-
less, on the whole, the approach was in an orthodox manner and the
reasoning conventional. The Court had perhaps not emerged entirely
from that formative period of judicial history in which its decisions
were said to show "with what slowness and hesitation the court arrived
at the conviction of the full powers which the Constitution and acts of
Congress have vested in the Federal judiciary," 20 and this though the
source of that utterance was a decision announced only a year later
than that in The Plymouth. Not unlikely, too, the uncompromising
spirit of the old common-law judges in the tradition of Coke and Holt
was still exercising at least a remote measure of influence. Still, the
conclusion was not at that time inevitable. The argument of counsel
seeking to support jurisdiction was supported by citation of cases "tend-
ing to show that under the ancient jurisdiction of the English admiralty
courts before it was curtailed by prohibitions, all damage done to
wharves; docks and the shores of public rivers was within its cog-
nizance." 21 A Court, constituted of members more liberally inclined
16. Hough, Admiralty Jurisdiction-Of Late Years (1924) 37 HbRv. L. REV. 529, 535.
17. Supra note 1.
IS. Id. at 34-35 (italics added).
19. Bruncken, Tradition and Comnmonsense in Admiralty (1929) 14 MAIQuETTE L.
REv. 16.
20. The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555, 562 (U. S. 1866).
21. Brown, supra note 2, at 9-10.
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toward admiralty jurisdiction, might thus have shaken off the shackles
of those postulates and logical deductions that proved so compelling
and decided otherwise.22 As asserted by Mr. Justice Holmes, "The
precise scope of admiralty jurisdiction is not a matter of obvious prin-
ciple or of very accurate history."2  There has always been a large
measure of eclecticism exercised by the courts in incorporating into
our admiralty law the raw jurisprudential material from which its
foundations have been wrought. In particular,
".. . on the vital point of expounding the constitutional grant, and ascer-
taining and declaring what are and what are not 'cases of admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction,' that Court [United States Supreme Court] for more than
a century has pursued its own method of selection and exclusion, choosing
what seemed suitable from the whole range of maritime law (or customs),
whether English, Continental, or Colonial, sometimes throwing away its first
choice, but authoritatively labelling its excerpts for the time being as the
maritime law of the United States." 24
As late as 1904, so eminent an authority on admiralty as Mr. Justice
Brown, concurring in The Blackheath,' unhesitatingly accepted that
decision "as practically overruling the former ones, and as recognizing
the principle adopted by the English Admiralty Court Jurisdiction Act
of 1861 (sec. 7),26 extending the jurisdiction of the admiralty court to
'any claim for damages by any ship.'
There have not been lacking from time to time some indications that
the tide has commenced, in a measure at least, to run against the nar-
row logic of the decision in The Plymouth. For while in its broad formu-
lations the rule has been repeatedly approved, in practice its scope has
been cut down through refinements in its application. In The Black-
heath,77 the Supreme Court, overruling contrary views entertained by
the District Court, extended jurisdiction to embrace damages caused
by a ship to a beacon which "stood fifteen or twenty feet from the chan-
nel of Mobile river, or bay, in water twelve or fifteen feet deep, and
was built on piles driven firmly into the bottom." In The Raithmoor,2
jurisdiction was further extended to include damages to a beacon in the
process of erection and to a temporary platform used in connection with
22. As late as 1909, it was asserted on eminent authority that "if the question were
an original one and the true reason for the existence of an admiralty jurisdiction were
examined de novo, the result might perhaps have been different," and that "the truth is,
that of the many tests applied to define that jurisdiction, none is decisive." Id. at 10.
23. The Blackheath, 195 U. S. 361, 365 (1904).
24. Hough, supra note 16, at 529.
25. Supra note 23, at 368.
26. 24 & 25 VIcT. c. 10, § 7 (1861).
27. Supra note 23.
28. 241 U. S. 166 (1916).
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the work. In his concurring opinion in The Blackheath, to which refer-
ence has been made, Mr. Justice Brown said of such fine distinctions:
"To attempt to draw the line of jurisdiction between different kinds of
fixed structures, as, for instance, between beacons and wharves, would
lead to great confusion and much further litigation." 29 And confusion
and much further litigation there has been over the difficulty of differ-
entiating between objects or structures which take their character from
the land to which they are in some manner connected and those on the
other hand which are deemed so related to navigation as to become sub-
jects of maritime jurisdiction. No extended reference to these cases is
required. In The Panoil,30 the Supreme Court declined jurisdiction of
damages to a spur dike extending into the Mississippi River, though
the "special purpose" of it was stated to be "to slacken the current,
induce deposits of sediment and eventually build out the shore; and
in this way to improve the channel and aid navigation." Shortly there-
after, however, in Doullut & Williams Co., Inc. v. United States,3 the
Court, overruling the decision below, held to be within the cognizance
of an admiralty court injuries to clusters of river piles, entirely sur-
rounded by water and used exclusively for vessels to tie up to for
security.
A subject-matter which raises such issues cannot be so confidently
relegated to assured non-maritime zones of the law. In this connection,
the English Admiralty Court Jurisdiction Act 32 cited by Mr. Justice
Brown is not without significance. It is true, of course, that English
legislation enjoys a freedom from constitutional limitations unknown
in America.33  Nevertheless, there are interesting implications underlying
its enactment, particularly in connection with a commentary such as that
proffered by Holdsworth, in which this statute is cited among others,
to the effect that "Modern legislation has restored to the court of Admi-
ralty many of the powers, and much of the jurisdiction of which it had
been deprived in the seventeenth century." 34 The thesis might be in-
definitely amplified, but the conclusion ventured is that damages caused
by vessels on navigable water, wheresoever consummated, come reason-
ably within the ambit of that power conceded to Congress "to alter and
amend the maritime law and make substantive innovations therein." 3
29. The Blackheath, supra note 23, at 369.
30. 266 U. S. 433 (1925).
31. 268 U. S. 33 (1925).
32. Note 26, supra.
33. Cf. Detroit Trust Co. v. Barium Steamship Co., 56 F. (2d) 455 (W. D. N. Y.
1932): "It seems to me that the power of Congress under the Constitution to assign
to the courts certain duties under the head of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, is not
less than the power of Parliament under the English Constitution."
34. 1 HoLDswoaRE, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1922) 558.
35. See The Oconee, supra note 14, at 931.
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This power has elsewhere been defined in terms of discretion of some
amplitude. As put in Panama Railroad Co. v. Johnson,3 6
"When all is considered . . . there is no room to doubt that the power of
Congress extends to the entire subject and permits of the exercise of a wide
discretion. But there are limitations which have come to be well recognized.
One is that there are boundaries to the maritime law and admiralty jurisdic-
tion which inhere in those subjects and cannot be altered by legislation, as
by excluding a thing falling clearly within them or including a thing falling
dearly without."
Having regard, among other things, to the origin, history and practical
functioning of the rule discussed, and the character of the subject-matter
to be regulated, it seems to the writer rather dogmatic to assert with
finality that these "amphibious" transactions are "clearly without" the
scope of the "wide discretion" that Congress is conceded to possess.
A reference to the history of maritime mortgages will, it is believed,
supply some instructive, if not controlling, analogies. In 1854, in
Bogart v. The John Jay,"7 the Supreme Court was confronted with the
question of whether a court of admiralty could afford relief to a mort-
gagee of a ship. The jurisdiction was emphatically denied, the Court
asserting of the underlying reason:
"Its foundation is, that the mere mortgage of a ship, other than that of an
hypothecated bottomry, is a contract without any of the characteristics or
attendants of a maritime loan, and is entered into by the parties to it, with-
out reference to navigation or perils of the sea. It is a security to make the
performance of the mortgagor's undertaking more certain; and, whilst he
continues in possession of the ship, disconnecting the mortgagee from all agency
and interest in the employment and navigation of her, and from all responsi-
bility for contracts made on her account. Such a mortgage has nothing in it
analogous to those contracts which are the subjects of admiralty jurisdiction.
In such a case, the ship is the object for the accomplishment of the contract,
without any reference to the use of her for such a purpose. There cannot be,
then, anything maritime in it. A failure to perform such a contract cannoti
make it maritime." 3
But though the Court thus confidently asserted that the mortgage was
"a contract without any of the characteristics or attendants of a mari-
time loan" and had "nothing in it analogous to those contracts which
are the subjects of admiralty jurisdiction," it concluded its opinion
with the significant statement that "Until that [legislation as in Eng-
land] shall be done in the United States, by congress, the rule, in this
36. 264 U. S. 375, 386 (1924).
37. 17 How. 399 (U. S. 1854).
38. Id. at 402 (italics added).
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particular, must continue in the admiralty courts of the United States,
as it has been." "
The decision in The John Jay remained the unquestioned law until
1920,40 when Congress enacted the Ship Mortgage Act.41  By this
statute, upon the compliance with certain formalities, and subject to
certain priorities, a mortgage on a vessel is given the status of maritime
security enforceable in admiralty proceedings. The constitutionality of
this measure has never come directly before the Supreme Court for
adjudication. In a number of cases in the federal District Courts, how-
ever, the issue has been squarely raised and the validity of the Act
upheld.4 2  The Act has, moreover, been incidentally involved in litiga-
tion before the Supreme Court, and rights asserted thereunder have
been discussed and determined on the tacit assumption of constitu-
tionality.43 It is highly improbable that this legislation, now more
than thirteen years on the books, and under which millions of dollars
have doubtless been advanced in reliance upon the statutory security,
will ever be impeached on constitutional grounds.
While perhaps less analogically persuasive than the case of ship
mortgages, the manner in which the statutory limitation of a ship owner's
liability has been extended to non-maritime torts is not entirely unin-
structive. In Richardson v. Harmon,4 4 the Supreme Court, upon a
petition for limitation of liability on behalf of the owners of a vessel
that had collided with and damaged the abutment of a railroad draw-
bridge, held the case within the statute,4 5 and enjoined the further prose-
cution of a pending action against the petitioners at common law.
Earlier, in Ex parte Phoenix Insurance Co.,46 a case reminiscent of The
Plymouth, it had been held that jurisdiction as to limitation of liability
could not be extended to land damages caused by a fire originating on
a ship. Yet in the later case the power of Congress to bring such
claims within the jurisdiction was assumed, and discussion was confined
to the construction of the statute.
39. Id. at 403.
40. 1 BENr icT, ArDimmTY (5th ed. 1925) 106, and cases there cited, n. 28.
41. Act of June 5, 1920, § 30, 41 STAT. 1000 (1920), 46 U. S. C. §§ 911-984 (1926).
42. The Oconee, supra note 14; The Nanking, 292 Fed. 642 (N. D. Cal. 1923); The
Lincoln Land, 295 Fed. 358 (D. Mass. 1924); Detroit Trust Co. v. Barium Steamship
Co., supra note 33.
43. The Northern Star, 271 U. S. 552 (1926); see The President Arthur, 279 U. S.
564 (1929).
44. 222 U. S. 96 (1911).
45. Act of June 26, 1884, § 18, 23 STAT. 57 (1884), 46 U. S. C. § 189 (1926), amend-
ing Act of March 3, 1851, § 3, 9 STAT. 635 (1851), 46 U. S. C. § 183 (1926).
46. 118 U. S. 610 (1886).
47. Cf. 1 BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 40, at 48, referring to the Limited Liability
Act "which, though in principle a restoration of the general maritime law, is, especially in




At least passing reference should be conceded in this general con-
nection to the part played by legislation in breaking down the doctrine
established in The Thomas Jefferson,4s wherein, through its spokesman
Judge Story, the Court held waters above the ebb and flow of the tide,
though navigable, without the admiralty jurisdiction. The breach was
effected two decades and a half later when in The Genesee Chief 4 an
act of Congress,"' extending maritime jurisdiction to the Great Lakes,
was upheld. The complete demolition of the rule was soon to follow. 1
Similarly, District Judge Partridge in The Nanking, 2 wherein the con-
stitutionality of the Ship Mortgage Act was upheld, referred to the
Federal Maritime Lien Act 13 as "another clear case of a statute giving
to admiralty jurisdiction of matters concerning which the Supreme Court
had declared it had no jurisdiction." And in this connection Judge
Hough wrote with certain rude vigor, "The well-known history of the
Lien Law of 1910 is a perfect example of the way in which customs
enlarge, the courts lag and Congress kicks them into legal harmony." 54
A cursory survey of a somewhat parallel situation in the field of mari-
time contracts should also suggest some interesting analogies in con-
nection with the subject under discussion. "Whether rightly or wrong-
ly," as put by Benedict,- it has been definitely ruled that contracts for
the construction of a ship 53 or for its original equipment and outfit-
ting 57 are without the jurisdiction of the admiralty. Though such an
agreement was characterized as "clearly not a maritime contract" 51
and though the ruling has been acquiesced in since its original enuncia-
tion by the Supreme Court seven years before the decision in The Ply-
mouth, there have not infrequently been indications in subsequent opin-
ions that the Court in retrospect, though feeling constrained to follow
the precedent as established, has lingering regrets for the severely nar-
row spirit in which this doctrine, in common with much of the formative
48. 10 Wheat. 428 (U. S. 1825).
49. 12 How. 443 (U. S. 1851).
50. Act of Feb. 26, 1845, 5 STAT. 726 (1845), 28 U. S. C. § 770 (1926).
51. Fritz v. Bull, 12 How. 466 (U. S. 1851) ; The Magnolia, 20 How. 296 (U. S. 1857);
The Hine v. Trevor, supra note 20.
52. Supra note 42.
53. Act of June 23, 1910, 36 STAT. 604 (1910), incorporated with slight modification
into the Merchant Marine Act of June 5, 1920, § 30, 41 STAT. 1005 (1920), 46 U. S. C.
§ 971 (1926).
54. Hough, supra note 16, at 536.
55. 1 BENEDICT, op. cit. supra note 40, at 91.
56. People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 20 How. 393 (U. S. 1857); cases cited in 1 BENEDICT,
op. cit. supra note 40, at 91-93.
57. Thames Towboat Co. v. The Francis McDonald, 254 U. S. 242 (1920); and cases
cited note 56, supra.
58. Roach v. Chapman, 22 How. 129 (U. S. 1859).
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work of laying the foundations of the American admiralty law, was
evolved. Certainly there is little in the original reasons educed in
support of the rule that indicates a broad conception of the scope of
the classic admiralty tradition or a receptive attitude toward the elabora-
tion of a liberal maritime jurisprudence. Indisputedly, the building of
ships was a subject with which the early English admiralty jurisdiction
was not unacquainted. Early in the seventeenth century such a juris-
diction was conceded to the admiralty in an attempt by the Privy Coun-
cil, under the commission of Charles I, "to reconcile the differences
between the common law courts and the Admiralty." 19 Referring to
the ultimate legislative settlement of the conflict, Holdsworth asserts
that "It [the court of Admiralty] has been restored, as we have seen,
to its ancient position of a court of record; and its judge has been given
the powers possessed by the judges of the superior courts of common law.
It has been given jurisdiction in cases of salvage, bottomry, damage,
towage, goods supplied to foreign ships, building, equipping and repair-
ing ships, disputes between co-owners." 60 Here, as in the case of the
ruling in The Plymouth, the Supreme Court is seen deferring to the
limited scope of the English admiralty jurisdiction after it suffered
a serious impairment of its original powers as a result of its classic
contest with the common-law courts and before the ultimate restoration
of its ancient jurisdiction by modern legislation.
The growth of our waterborne commerce and the evolution of its
instrumentalities, since the judicial launching of The Plymouth, have
only served to make more clear the present-day ineptitude of a rule
based upon a technical, albeit logical, bifurcation of a transaction into
causative factors and place of consummation for the purpose of deter-
mining tort jurisdiction in admiralty. The development of the modern
ship, not infrequently huge in bulk, usually of steel construction and
generally equipped with engines capable of generating enormous power,
has created instrumentalities of great potential destructive capacity.
Collisions between such vessels and docks, wharves, bridges and other
structures adjacent to navigable waters are not unlikely to cause ex-
tensive damage. Certainly the handling of ships in close proximity to
land structures, with the added elements of wind, tide and current, not
infrequently presents problems requiring for their solution the high de-
gree of specialized knowledge and experience which is peculiarly that
of an admiralty judge. On the other hand, as has been asserted, "it
has become generally recognized by the profession that the inexpert
jury is not the best tribunal to pass upon the delicate questions of
mechanism in patent cases, or the manoeuvering of vessels in colli-
59. 1 HOLDSWORTHr, op. cit. supra note 34, at 555.
60. Id. at 558-559 (italics added).
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sion." 61 There is something paradoxical, to say the least, in excluding
a field of adjudication from the cognizance of the only court that,
through equipment and resources, is fully competent to deal with it, on
the ground that litigation within this field possesses none of the essential
characteristics of the type of cases with which this particular court was
specially created to deal. That the rule, pragmatically speaking, may
not have worked serious detriment in 1865 is a tenuous argument for
its retention years afterwards in the face of extensive changes. If the
number and continuity of the judicial repetitions of the locality-test
formula have closed the door to a remedy through "creative action of
the judge" in the "adaptation of rule or principle to changing combina-
tions of events," 62 at least Congress should be conceded the power to
effect the inclusion of these bipartite torts within the jurisdiction of the
admiralty. There is nothing against it but a judicial pronouncement
made in days remote from the present and under other conditions and
circumstances, reiterated on the basis of stare decisis.
On the assumption, however, that Congress lacks such power, the
maritime committee of the American Bar Association recommended in
its 1931 report the enactment of a compromise measure creating a lien
against the offending vessel to be enforced in any District Court of
the United States with "the right to attach the vessel to obtain se-
curity." 63 The proposed bill further provided that "The procedure in
such cases and the rules concerning damages shall be the same as those
prevailing in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction and the action
shall be tried by a judge without a jury, unless a jury is demanded by
the defendant before or when answer is filed." 64 Such a remedy had
been suggested on behalf of the Milwaukee Board of Harbor Commis-
sioners,65 though its proctor had hinted that "The danger seems to be
that the Supreme Court might hold that the introduction of this princi-
ple, of itself, makes the case one of admiralty." 66 Apart from the
grave objections to a jury in the trial of these actions and the fact
that it leaves untouched the old uncertainties as to what are land struc-
tures,67 reflection has convinced the writer that the construction of this
hybrid legislative conception may not unlikely, in and of itself, raise some
puzzling questions. It is time, rather, to rid our admiralty jurispru-
dence entirely of the rule in The Plymouth. Conditions call for a
61. Brown, supra note 2, at 14.
62. CARDozo, THE GROWTH Or THE LAW (1924) 135.
63. (1931) 56 A. B. A. REP. 316.
64. Ibid.
65. (1930) 55 id. at 314, 315.
66. Id. at 314.
67. This would be the situation in those close cases involving a decision as to whether
to proceed in admiralty or under this proposed statute.
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decisive operation that will remove the very root of the difficulty. It
is believed that this can be accomplished by legislation, simple in its
formulation and complete in its effectiveness. Should the attempt fail
through constitutional frustration, it will be time to think of compromis-
ing with the evils that are the reproach of the existing state of the law.
